While the philosophical literature has extensively studied how decisions relate to arguments, reasons and justifications, decision theory almost entirely ignores the latter notions and rather focuses on preference and belief. In this article, we argue that decision theory can largely benefit from explicitly taking into account the stance that decision-makers take towards arguments and counter-arguments. To that end, we elaborate a formal framework aiming to integrate the role of arguments and argumentation in decision theory and decision aid. We start from a decision situation, where an individual requests decision support. In this context, we formally define, as a commendable basis for decision-aid, this individual's deliberated judgment, popularized by Rawls. We explain how models of deliberated judgment can be validated empirically. We then identify conditions upon which the existence of a valid model can be taken for granted, and analyze how these conditions can be relaxed. We then explore the significance of our proposed framework for decision aiding practice. We argue that our concept of deliberated judgment owes its normative credentials both to its normative foundations (the idea of rationality based on arguments) and to its reference to empirical reality (the stance that real, empirical individuals hold towards arguments and counter-arguments, on due reflection). We then highlight that our framework opens promising avenues for future research involving both philosophical and decision theoretic approaches, as well as empirical implementations. * This is an author version.
Introduction
Introducing their so-called "reason-based theory of choice", Dietrich and List [2013] noticed that, although the relationship between reasons and actions has been extensively investigated in the philosophical literature, decision theory almost entirely ignores the concept of reason and strives to account for action and rationality exclusively in terms of preferences and beliefs. Despite Dietrich and List [2013, 2016] efforts, the gap remains large between philosophical and choice theoretic approaches. This gap echoes a classical dichotomy in the socalled "moral sciences" between, on the one hand, first-person justifications of one's acts in terms of reasons and arguments structuring these reasons, and on the other hand, third-person representations in terms of beliefs and preferences [Hausman, 2011] . By neglecting reason-based and other argumentative accounts, decision theory tends to demean decision-makers' understanding of their own actions. This stance has tended to insulate the literature on decision theory from important debates that unfolded in the past thirty to fourty years in the philosophical literature. Among the most influential approaches that have shaped these debates, Scanlon [2000] highlighted the links between reasons, justification and moral notions such as fairness and responsibility, Habermas' [1981] "theory of communicative action" articulated the importance of justification and argumentation as distinctive features of rational action, and Rawls [2005] launched what was to become the debates on the "acceptability" [Estlund, 2009] of reasons and arguments for public justification purposes.
At a more practical level, the gap between the third-person representations favored by decision theorists and the first-person accounts in terms of arguments and reasons also has important implications for decision-aiding practices. This gap indeed tends to make it all the more difficult for analysts to explain the advices they give to their clients as part of decision aiding processes in practice.
In this article, we aim to participate in unlocking this situation, by pursuing the dynamics launched by Dietrich and List [2013] , through an approach focused on the usage of arguments rather than on the notion of reason. Though the difference between these two notions could certainly feed deep philosophical debates, for our purposes in this paper we will simply assume that arguments motivate judgments whereas reasons motivate actions. Because our work will be focused on judgments, the concept of argument will be the most relevant one.
Our approach starts from and is largely structured by the point of view of decision analysis. We accordingly assume that a decision situation has been identified: we admit that there is an individual who requests decision support about a given topic (a set of questions she would like to answer). The individual requests support to answer questions such as: "is action a better than action b?", or "which beliefs should I have about such or such matter?".
In this setting, we introduce, as a commendable basis for recommendation, the "deliberated judgments" of our individual. This concept is inspired by Goodman's [1983] and Rawls' [1999] notion of reflective equilibrium. It also owes much to Roy [1996] 's view that an important part of the decision support interaction consists, for the analyst, in ensuring that the aided individual understands and accepts the reasoning on which the prescription is based. A central claim of ours in this article is that, by being based on "deliberated judgments", our approach manages to overcome some important weaknesses of more classical approaches based on revealed preferences or on what can be termed "shallow preferences" -that is, the everyday preferences of individuals making everyday decisions. Remark 1. To develop formal definitions of the concept of deliberated judgment and associated ones, we take advantage of formal argumentation theory as developed in artificial intelligence [Dung, 1995, Rahwan and Simari, 2009] . However, we use these concepts for another purpose and in different ways: formal argumentation theory typically considers situations where the relation between arguments is known, either because it can be computed from a given logical representation of the arguments [Besnard and Hunter, 2008] , or because it is given a priori [Baroni and Giacomin, 2009] . By contrast, the situations that we are interested in are the ones where the stance that individuals take towards arguments is not known a priori and precisely lies at the core of the inquiry. △ This article is organized as follows. In section 2, we define our core concepts, including the central concept of deliberated judgments. In section 3, we then explore the issue of how empirical data come into play and are involved in the validation of models. This illustrates the empirical aspect of our framework, which distinguishes it from standard prescriptive approaches. Lastly, section 4 discusses the significance of our approach for decision aiding practices and outlines future empirical applications.
Core concepts and notations
Let us start with a decision situation as defined in the introduction. We assume that a decision maker, call her i, is given, together with a topic T . We remain at a fairly abstract level in our conceptualization of the topic. We accordingly set aside all the issues concerning the construction of problems and the evolution of their meaning as the decision aiding process unfolds in concrete decision situations [Rosenhead and Mingers, 2001] . We therefore simply take the topic T to be a set of propositions concerning the decision problem. We do not formally define propositions and simply understand the notion in its ordinary sense. For example, a proposition can be an idea spelled out in a text in a natural language.
We also consider arguments that can be used by i to make up her mind about the propositions in T . Here we understand the notion of argument in a large sense: anything that can be used to support a proposition is an argument. An argument accordingly typically contains premisses and associated inferences. Arguments as we understand them can encompass a huge diversity, ranging from very basic arguments that can be stated in a couple of words, to intricate arguments embedding numerous sub-arguments associated to one another in complex ways.
The following identity criterion will then suffice to clarify the ontology of arguments needed for our purposes in this article : for two argument to be considered identical, we will require that they should be both extentionally and intensionally identical. For example, "Jean Tirole holds that the French economics minister should do x" and "Nobel Price Jean Tirole holds that the French economics minister should do x" are extentionally identical. But they might be intensionally non-identical, in the sense that some people ignoring who Jean Tirole is might be willing to reject that the first argument supports "the French economics minister should do x" while accepting that the second one supports it.
Let us then define S * as a set that contains all the arguments that one can make use of when trying to make up one's mind about T . S * can be conceived of in what one might call a strongly "realist" sense, in which one admits that a set of all the arguments that can possibly be raised always pre-exists in some sense. However, this assumption is not necessary for our framework to make sense. One can also understand S * as the set of all the arguments available around the temporal window within which the decision process is carried out. As the article unfolds, when these different interpretations of S * imply different interpretations of key concepts, these will be emphasized.
Observe that under both interpretations, in all decision situations but the most trivial, it will be untenable to assume that the analyst knows all of S * : the analyst will only know a strict subset S ⊂ S * , containing the arguments that she has been able to gather. Even under the weaker interpretation, claiming that S = S * would mean that there is no relevant knowledge beyond what the analyst can find by studying the literature and consulting experts and stakeholders, but also that the list of arguments she has found captures all the semantic and liguistic subtleties that could distinguish alternative formulations of arguments. An important part of our work in this article will be to identify conditions allowing to draw conclusions relating to S * despite the fact that no one ever knows more than a strict subset of S * .
Example 1 (Ranking). Let us simply illustrate the content of the concepts introduced so far. Let A be a set of alternatives that i is interested in ranking. Define S * as the set of all strings. For all a 1 , a 2 ∈ A, define t a 1 ≻a 2 as the sentence: "a 1 ought to be ranked above a 2 ", and t a 1 ∼a 2 as "a 1 ought to be ranked ex-aequo with a 2 ". Define T = ⋃ a 1 ,a 2 ∈A {t a 1 >a 2 , t a 1 ∼a 2 } as the set of all such sentences. The topic T represents the propositions on which i is interested to make up her mind. S * , the set of all strings, contains formulations of all the arguments that people can think about and make use of to make up their mind about the topic, and much more. An example of an argument is s = "Alternative a 1 ought to be ranked above a 2 because a 1 is better than a 2 on every criteria relevant to this problem". △ Our aim in this section is to define formally i's perspective towards the topic after he has considered all the arguments that are possibly relevant to the situation. We term this: i's Deliberated Judgment (DJ).
Argumentative stance
To define i's DJ, we first need to capture the stance that i takes towards arguments: given an argument s, does she endorse it or not? She can change her mind concerning some arguments because of reasons independent of her endeavor to tackle the problem she addresses, for example depending on her mood. More interestingly, i will possibly change her mind when confronted with new arguments as she struggles to make up her mind about the issue at hand. For example, imagine that i has heard about two arguments, s 2 and s 1 , and she thinks that s 2 turns s 1 into an invalid argument. But then she comes to realize that s 2 is in turn rendered invalid by a third argument, s 3 . After having thought about s 3 , it might be that i no longer considers that s 2 invalidates s 1 .
To formalize these ideas, let us define a set of possible perspectives P that i can be exposed to or have towards the topic T . That set represents elements that can influence i's stances. To take a trivial example, imagine that p 1 ∈ P represents the perspective that i takes in the morning, and p 2 ∈ P represents the perspective she takes during the rest of the day, where i's stance depends on whether she addresses the issue at stake in the morning or later. More interestingly, in some decision situations, it might be reasonable to assume that only giving new arguments to i renders a change of mind possible. In such cases, the perspectives in P are the sets of arguments that i can be exposed to.
The notion of perspective introduced here is purportedly rather abstract, and can encompass all sorts of aspects of situations that can lead an individual to change her mind. However, as will be clarified shortly, in the bulk of this article we will be mainly concerned with changes of perspective that correspond to the fact that our individual happens to be exposed to different sets of arguments. In real-life decision situations, such perspectival changes unfold in time. But in the formalism introduced here, it will not be necessary to explicitly introduce time.
Based on these notions, given a topic T (a set of propositions of interest to i) and S * , a set containing all the arguments possibly relevant to the topic, define i's argumentative stance towards T as (↝, ⊳ ∃ , ⋫ ∃ ), the three following relations. 
The two relations (⊳ ∃ , ⋫ ∃ ) allow to capture i's stance towards relations between arguments and the fact that i can change her mind about whether a given argument can undermine another argument. We assume that the pair of attack relations suffice to capture i's changes of mind towards the topic, and therefore use a single ↝ relation for simplicity.
Example 2 (Ranking (cont.)). Consider a set of criteria J. Consider the argument s b = "Alternative a 1 ought to be ranked above a 2 because a 1 is better than a 2 on three criteria while a 2 is better than a 1 on only one criterion", and s c = "It does not make sense to treat all criteria equally in this problem". Then (depending on i's opinion), it might hold that s c ⊳ ∃ s b , and it might hold that s b ↝ t a 1 ≻a 2 . Note that both may very well hold together. △ Definition 1 (Decision situation). We denote a decision situation by the tuple
We are interested in the part of (⊳ ∃ , ⋫ ∃ ) that is stable facing changes in perspective. Let us define the corresponding stable relations: ⊳ ∀ is defined as Example 3 (Ranking (cont.)). Consider alternatives a 1 and a 2 such that a 1 paretodominates a 2 on criteria J. Define s d as an argument that states that a 1 ought to be ranked above a 2 because of the pareto-domination situation considering the criteria in J. Then, it might hold that s d ↝ t a 1 >a 2 . Define s f as "this is an incorrect reasoning because an important aspect to be considered in the problem is fairness and a 1 is worse than a 2 in this respect". Then it might be that s f ⊳ ∃ s d (assuming that i indeed considers fairness as important and that J does not include fairness). If i later changes her mind about fairness being an important aspect to be considered in the problem, then it will not hold that s f ⊳ ∀ s d . △ This enables us to define a decisive argument as one that is never attacked by any argument belonging to S * .
Definition 2 (Decisive argument). Given a decision situation
Recall that s ′ ⋫ ∀ s means that s ′ never attacks s. A decisive argument is hence an argument that is never attacked by any other argument. Notice that decisive arguments can be of very different sorts. Some decisive arguments will be very simple and straightforward arguments, which are so simple that they will be accepted by i whatever the perspective. By contrast, some decisive arguments will be very elaborate ones, taking many aspects of the topic into account and anticipating all sorts of attacks, and accordingly never attacked by any other argument.
Example 4 (weather forecast). Assume that individual i holds that t = "it will rain tomorrow" is supported by the argument s 1 = "one can expect that it will rain tomorrow because weather forecast predicts so". (See fig. 1 .) But imagine that i also holds, at least from some perspective, that s 2 = "weather forecast is unreliable to infer what the weather will be like tomorrow because weather forecast is often wrong" is a counter-argument that successfully attacks s 1 . Imagine further that i would, at least from some perspectives, accept as an attack against s 2 an argument s 3 = "although it is often wrong, weather forecast is reliable because it is more often right than wrong". Imagine, finally, that no argument attacks s 3 from any perspective.
In such a case, for i, s 1 is not a decisive argument. However, one can elaborate a more complex argument s = "weather forecast predicts that it will rain tomorrow. It may be an incorrect prediction, but weather forecast is more often right than wrong, thus its prediction constitute a sufficient basis to think that it will rain tomorrow". Notice that s includes the reasonings given by s 1 and s 3 . Because s anticipates the attack s 2 , s could be decisive in supporting t (as assumed in fig. 1 ). △
Deliberated judgment
Given a decision situation, we are now in a position to characterize i's stance towards the propositions in the topic T once he has considered all the relevant weather f. predicts so (s 1 ) ↝ rain tomorrow (t)
weather forecast is often wrong (s 2 )
weather forecast is more often right (s 3 ) arguments. We say that a proposition is acceptable if it is supported by a decisive argument. (Beware that some authors in the litterature in formal argumentation talk about the acceptability of arguments; here we talk about the acceptability of propositions. The two notions are markedly different.) A proposition is said to be excludable when each argument that supports it is attacked by a decisive argument.
Definition 3 (Acceptable and excludable propositions). Given a decision situation (T, S
• acceptable iff ∃s ∈ S * | s ↝ t and ∀s ′ ∶ s ′ ⋫ ∀ s;
Three important aspects of this definition are worth emphazising. First, notice that we use modal terms to name these notions: we talk about "acceptable" rather than about "accepted" propositions. This is because, at a given point of time, individual i might well fail to accept, as a matter of brute empirical fact, a proposition supported by a decisive argument, for example, because she does not know of this argument. Similarly, she might accept an excludable proposition. All this is despite the fact that the decisive arguments referred to in the definitions of acceptable and excludable propositions are decisive according to i's argumentative stance -that is, by i's own standards.
Second, according to our definition, it is possible for a proposition t to be acceptable and for not-t, or more generally for any proposition t ′ in logical contradiction with t or having empirical incompatibilities with t, to be acceptable too. This specific definition allows to encompass situations in which there are intrinsically no more reason to accept t than t ′ . Relatedly, notice that with respect to this aspect, there is an important asymmetry between the notions of acceptable and excludable. Because t and t ′ can both be acceptable, the fact that t is acceptable does not necessarily imply that the fate of t in i's view is entirely settled by its acceptability. By contrast, there is no way an excludable proposition could come back into the scene.
Lastly, notice that according to our definition, a proposition can't be both acceptable and excludable, but it may be neither acceptable nor excludable. This may be the case if all the arguments supporting t have counterarguments, but for at least one argument, none of its counter-argument is decisive.
Decision situations allowing to classify unambiguously all propositions in the agenda into acceptable or excludable propositions are of distinctive interest. Let us term such decision situations "clear-cut".
Given a decision situation, we can now define i's DJ as those propositions t ∈ T that are acceptable.
Definition 5 (DJ of i). The Deliberated Judgment corresponding to a decision situation
The meaning of this definition depends on the interpretation given to S * (see the beginning of section 2). In the strongly realist interpretation, i's DJ is unique and fixed once and for all. By contrast, in the alternative interpretation, i's DJ may evolve with time, as new arguments emerge.
Example 5 (weather forecast (cont.)). To explain clearly this definition, it is useful here to come back to our previous example ( fig. 1 ) of individual i who holds that "weather forecast is often wrong" (s 2 ) is a counter-argument that successfully attacks "it will rain tomorrow because weather forecast predicts so" (s 1 ). We have seen that a more complex argument (s), including both "weather forecast predicts that it will rain tomorrow" and an additional sub-argument attacking s 2 , can turn out to be a decisive argument to support "it will rain tomorrow" (t). In such a case, t belongs to i's deliberated judgment, despite the fact that he might claim otherwise if not confronted with the complex argument above. △
Issues of empirical validation
The former section clarified definitions and explained the articulations between the key concepts of our framework, at a rather abstract level. Now we want to investigate how this framework can be confronted with empirical reality.
Let us first define a model η as a pair (↝ η , ⊳ η ), and T η as the set of propositions that the model η claims are supported:
We stress that these relations should not be considered as an approximation of the real ↝, ⊳ ∃ relations characterizing i. We will come back to this important point below. Suffice for now to observe that the model does not aim at reflecting in detail what i thinks about all arguments, but more modestly seeks to know i's DJ.
Example 6 (Ranking (cont.)). We have already defined a set of alternatives A, propositions T representing possible comparisons of the alternatives, and criteria J. Consider further a set of criteria functions (g j ) j∈J evaluating all alternatives a ∈ A using real numbers: g j ∶ A → R.
Imagine that i's problem is to decide which kind of vegetable to grow in his backyard. Assume an analyst providing decision aid to i considers that the problem can be reduced to a ranking between three candidate vegetables: carrots, lettuce and pumpkins, denoted by c, l, p ∈ A. The analyst believes that i is ready to rank vegetables according to exactly two criteria. The analyst has obtained six real numbers g j (a), representing the performances of each alternative on each criteria, and believes that i is ready to rank vegetables according to the sum of their performances on the two criteria, v(a) = g 1 (a) + g 2 (a).
The analyst can now try to represent i's stance using a model η = (↝ η , ⊳ η ) by producing sentences that explain to i the "reasoning" underlying the definition of v. Assume the values given by v position carrots as winners. The analyst could define an argument s (c,l) "carrots are a better choice than lettuce because carrots score g 1 (c) on criterion one, and g 2 (c) on criterion two, which gives it a value v(c), whereas lettuce scores g 1 (l) on criterion one, and g 2 (l) on criterion two, which gives it an inferior value of v(l)". In the model of the analyst, this argument supports the proposition that carrots are ranked higher than lettuce: s (c,l) ↝ η t c≻l . The model contains similar arguments in favor of other propositions t ∈ T that are in agreement with the values given by v. In our example, the analyst furthermore believes that no counter-arguments are necessary and thus defines ⊳ η = ∅. △
Validity and the problem of observability
Because the point of carving out η is to capture i's Deliberated Judgment T i , we can define a valid model as one that correctly captures T i .
Definition 6 (Validity). A model η is valid iff
How can the analyst determine if a given model η is a valid one? Let us assume that the only information that he can use for that purpose is the one he can get by querying i -and is, in that sense, "observable" for him.
As opposed to "shallow" preferences, DJs are not directly observable. Indeed, i's DJ are defined in terms of ⋫ ∀ . But observing ⋫ ∀ would require that i takes successively all the possible perspectives she can have. This amounts to assume that i already knows all arguments and can aggregate them successfully. If this were possible, i would probably not need help from an analyst.
Validation therefore creates for our approach a problem that does not exist in approaches based on shallow preference: how can one get cues concerning i's DJ when one only has access to observable data? To the best of knowledge, the litterature in formal argumentation theory has so far left this problem untouched, for reasons indicated in remark 1.
In the remainder of this section, we explain our solution to this problem in two steps. First, section 3.2 introduces a provisional solution, by identifying conditions that guarantee the existence of a model allowing to identify i's DJ on the basis of what we will call an "operational" validity criterion -that is, a criterion based on observable data. Then, section 3.3 elaborates on the first step and thereby provides a more ambitious solution.
Existence of a valid model and its conditions
In this subsection, we introduce apparently reasonable conditions about the way i reasons and about the decision situation. Our theorem will then guarantee that a model exists and captures correctly i's DJ if those conditions are satisfied on the whole set of arguments S * and if the model satisfies an operational validity criterion to be defined below. The next subsection will show how to relax those conditions. For simplicity's sake, let us restrict the kind of models that we consider. We mandate that each proposition in the topic may be supported by at most one argument according to ↝ η , and η has at most one counter-argument for each argument, thus ⊳ −1 η (s) is a singleton or empty, ∀s ∈ S * . These two conditions about η can be relaxed without much difficulty. They are used here to simplify the presentation.
A first condition about ⊳ ∃ mandates a certain form of stability. It assumes that i possibly changes her mind about whether an argument s ′ attacks another one only when there exists another argument attacking s ′ . 
Condition 1 (Justifiable unstability). A decision situation
Let us now turn to the second condition. It has to do with the way i reasons. Imagine that i finds himself in the following uneasy situation. He declares that s 1 is attacked by s 2 . However, i is also ready to declare that s 2 is in turn attacked by s 3 , a decisive argument.
Clearly, in such a situation, i's credence in the strength of s 2 appears fragile. It therefore seems natural enough to assume that, if we carve out an argument s, playing the same argumentative role as s 1 , but anticipating and defeating the attack by s 2 , i will endorse s.
This assumption is formalized by the condition Closed under reinstatement, below. To write it down, we first need to formalize, thanks to the following notion of replacement, the idea that a set of arguments plays an argumentative role similar to the one of another argument. We say a set of arguments S ⊆ S * replaces an argument s ∈ S * whenever all arguments attacked by s are also attacked by some argument s ′ ∈ S, and all propositions supported by s are also supported by some argument s ′ ∈ S.
Definition 7 (Replacing arguments). A set of arguments S ⊆ S * replaces s ∈ S * iff ⊳ ∃ (s) ⊆ ⊳ ∃ (S) and ↝(s) ⊆ ↝(S). We say that s ′ replaces s, with s, s ′ ∈ S * , to mean that {s ′ } replaces s.
Condition 2 (Closed under reinstatement). A decision situation
∃s | s replaces s 1 and ⊳
The condition mandates that, whenever some decisive argument rebuts the argument s 2 attacking s 1 , it is possible to replace s 1 by an argument that has no other attackers than s 1 's and is no longer attacked by s 2 .
Finally, we introduce two conditions on the size of chains of arguments and counter-arguments. We talk about a chain of length k in ⊳ ∃ to refer to a finite sequence Let us now define the following "operational" validity criterion for a model η intended to capture i's DJ. We term it "operational" to emphasize that, as opposed to the definition of validity (definition 6), it can be checked on the sole basis of observable data.
Definition 8 (Operational validity criterion). A model η of a decision situation is operationally valid iff, whenever (s ↝ η t), it holds that [s ↝ t] and [∀s
, and whenever t is not supported by η,
This criterion amounts to partially comparing, on the one hand, i's stances towards propositions and arguments, and on the other, η's representations of i's stances. More precisely, a model satisfies the operational validity criterion (for short: is operationally valid) iff:
(i) arguments that, according to the model, support a proposition t are indeed considered by i as supporting t;
(ii) whenever a model uses an argument s to support a claim, and that argument is attacked by a counter-argument s c , the model can answer with a counter-counter-argument, using a counter-counter-argument that i confirms indeed attacks the counter-argument s c ;
(iii) whenever an argument s supports a proposition that the model does not consider as supported, the model is able to attack that argument using a counter-argument that i indeed thinks is an attack against s.
(This procedure could be considered as a persuasion dialogue [Prakken, 2009] .) As required, this criterion is uniquely based on observable data. Indeed, recall that the only observable data that the analyst can use are the ones obtained by querying i to ask her if a given argument s 2 attacks another argument s 1 . If she replies that it does, this is enough to conclude that, according to her, s 2 ⊳ ∃ s 1 . Indeed, in such a case we know that there is at least one perspective from which she thinks that s 2 attacks s 1 : namely, the perspective that she currently has. Querying i can thus provide the information needed to check if a model is operationaly valid. By contrast, because querying i will not give enough information to know that s 2 ⊳ ∀ s 1 (if indeed s 2 ⊳ ∀ s 1 ), querying i will never allow to directly claim that a model satisfies the definition 6 of validity. What we need therefore is a means to ensure that an operationally valid model is a valid one. This is provided by the following theorem (the proofs of our theorems can be found in appendix A).
Theorem 1. Assume a decision situation (T, S * , ↝, ⊳ ∃ , ⋫ ∃ ) is closed under reinstatement, justifiably unstable and has bounded length and breadth. Then: i) the decision situation is clear-cut; ii) there exists an operationally valid model of that decision situation; iii) any operationally valid model η satisfies
Example 7 (Budget reform). Let us take a non trivial example that will be used to illustrate how theorem 1 can be used and why we need to go beyond this first theorem. Imagine that i is a political decision maker. She wants to run for an election, and is elaborating her policy agenda. She has heard about Meinard et al.'s [2017] (thereafter refered to as "M") argument that, according to a popular survey, biodiversity should be ranked after retirement schemes and public transportation, but before relations with foreign countries, order and security, and culture and leisure in the expanses of the State. Assume that i wants to make up her mind about the single proposition t = "I should include in my agenda a reform to increase public spendings on biodiversity conservation so that biodiversity would be ranked higher than relations with foreign countries in the State budget".
She requests the help of a decision-analyst. The latter starts by reviewing the literature to identify a set of arguments with which he will work. (The arguments are illustred in fig. 2 .) He thereby identifies that proposition t can be considered supported by s = "M's finding (stated above) is based on a large scale survey and quantitative statistical analysis, and their protocol was designed to track the preferences that citizens express in popular votes. There are therefore scientific reasons to think that a policy package including the corresponding reform will gather support among voters." Pursuing his exploration of the recent economic literature on environmental valuation methods, the analyst could identify only two counterarguments to s:
• s c1 = "M's measure is extremely rough as compared to more classical economic valuations, such as Contingent Valuations and the like [Kontoleon et al., 2007] , which makes it non credible as a guide for policy."
• s c2 = "M claims to value biodiversity per se. The very meaning of such an endeavor is questionable because it is too abstract. More classical economic valuations are focused on concrete objects and projects, which is more promising."
But he also found a counter-counterargument to each of these counterarguments:
• s c1c = "biodiversity is not the kind of thing about which people make decisions in their everyday life. Their preferences about it are accordingly likely to be rough. The exceedingly precise measurements provided by contingent valuations and the like are therefore more a weakness than a strength."
• s c2c = "abstract notions such as biodiversity are an important determining factor for many people when they make decisions. Eschewing to value them is ill-founded."
Imagine further that the analyst has not found any argument attacking either s c1c or s c2c . will gather support (s) ↝ η increase spendings (t) rough measure (s c1 ) abstract (s c2 ) Assume that the analyst is justified to think that i's reasoning is such that S * is closed under reinstatement, is justifiably unstable, and has bounded length and breadth. Recall now that, in order to identify the propositions lying in T i , the analyst must identify stable supports facing attacks from the whole of S * . In other words, the analyst must test the claims of the model not only against the counter-arguments in S, but against the whole of S * , which the analyst ignores. Imagine now that the analyst assumes that, even though S is a strict subset of S * , S is a good enough approximation of S * , in the sense that that there is no argument in S * ∖ S that attacks any argument in S or supports any proposition t ∈ T .
Thanks to theorem 1, the analyst can then deduce that the situation is clearcut and that there exists a valid model of the decision situation. The next step for him is to carve out a model η reproducing the relations between arguments that he found in the litterature, and then to test whether his model is operationally valid using definition 8.
In order to validate η, he would first ask i whether she agrees that s supports t. If so, he then would check whether i considers that s c1 is a counter-argument to s, in which case the analyst would check that the counter-counterargument that he envisaged, s c1c , is considered by i to attack s c1 . The analyst would then proceed in a similar way with the second chain of counterarguments (s c2 and s c2c ), which would eventually allow him to conclude on the validity of the model η. Should it prove operationally valid, the analyst could then conclude that T i = {t} (using theorem 1 and T η = {t}).
But notice that this whole story only works because we assumed that arguments in S * ∖ S never attack any argument in S. This assumption is clearly unrealistic: any slight reformulation of s c1 , for example, will most likely also attack s. This is not the only unrealistic assumption in our hypothetical sce-nario: it is also unlikely that the whole set S * indeed satisfies bounded length, for example. This condition requires an absence of cycle in the attack relation. While this may be considered to hold on S, it is possible that some ambiguous or poorly phrased arguments in S * would confuse i in such a way that i will declare, for example, that two such unclear arguments attack each other, or that s 1 ⊳ ∃ s 2 ⊳ ∃ s 3 ⊳ ∃ s 1 for some triple of such unclear arguments. Hence the need to go beyond theorem 1. △ Theorem 1 embodies an important step towards being able to confront models of deliberated judgment with empirical reality, by spelling out sufficient conditions upon which unrolling the procedures of refutation is not a pure waste of time and energy, because there is something to be found. It also illustrates the potential usefulness of the notion of operational validity. Indeed, since the point of the modeling endeavor in our context is to capture T i , we know by virtue of iii) in theorem 1 that, if the corresponding conditions are met, and if we have good reasons to believe that we have an operationally valid model, then we can admit that it captures T i .
However, establishing this theorem can not be more than just a first step. As illustrated in example 7, the conditions above are quite heroic. One cannot realistically expect that real-life decision situations will fulfill these conditions. The most important issue is that we need a means to distinguish S * from the restricted set of arguments with which the analyst works in practice. And we need means to make sure that the restricted set indeed "covers" the matter "sufficiently", so as to escape the situation in which the analyst is locked in example 7, where he finds himself condemned to make wildly unrealistic assumption. The next subsection tackles this pivotal issue.
Weakening of some conditions
To obtain the results we want, all we actually need is that it should be possible to define a subset of arguments S γ ⊆ S * that satisfies conditions akin to the ones defined above, and which are sufficient to cover the topic at hand.
Let us start by formalizing the requirement, for S γ , to cover the topic at hand. What we want is that all the arguments needed for the decision-maker to make up her mind about the topic should be encapsulated in S γ . This means that, if arguments from s ∈ S * ∖ S γ are brought to bear, it should be possible either to discard them or to show that they can be replaced by arguments in S γ . This is done thanks to the following formal definitions and condition.
Definition 9 (Unnecessary argument). We say S ⊆ S * essentially replaces s ∈ S * iff (⊳ ∃ (s) ∩ S γ ) ⊆ ⊳ ∃ (S) and ↝(s) ⊆ ↝(S). We say an argument s ∈ S * is resistant iff it is not attacked by any decisive argument in S γ . We say that an argument s ∈ S * is unnecessary iff s is attacked by a resistant argument from S γ , or s is essentially replaceable by S with S ⊆ S γ and S containing only resistant arguments.
Condition 5 (Covering set of arguments)
. Given a decision situation and a set of arguments S γ ⊆ S * , S γ is covering iff all arguments s ∈ S * ∖S γ are unnecessary.
Let us now relax the conditions of theorem 1 by formulating weaker requirements confined to S γ . This adaptation is straightforward for conditions 1 and 2.
Condition 6 (Justifiably unstable set of arguments). Given a decision situation and a subset S γ ⊆ S * of arguments, we say that the set S γ is justifiably unstable if, for all s ∈ S * , s
Condition 7 (Set of arguments closed under reinstatement). Given a decision situation (T, S * , ↝, ⊳ ∃ , ⋫ ∃ ) and a subset S γ ⊆ S * of arguments, we say that the set S γ is closed under reinstatement iff, ∀s 1 , s 3 ∈ S γ , s 1 ≠ s 3 , s 3 not attacking s 1 , s 3 decisive:
Similarly, we can relax condition 3 and apply it to a subset of arguments. When an argument has very numerous counter-arguments, one may think that their vast number might spring from some common reasoning that they share. For example, an argument might involve some real value as part of its reasoning, and be multiplied as infinitely many similar arguments of the same kind using tiny variations of that real value. If so, and if we know that we can convincingly rebut each of these counter-arguments, we might believe that only a small number of counter-counter-arguments suffice to rebut the counter-arguments.
Definition 10 (Defense). We say s ∈ S * is S γ -defended if all the attackers s c of s are attacked by a decisive argument in S γ , or formally,
there exists a set S ⊆ S γ of arguments of cardinal at most j such that s is S-defended (thus, if j arguments from S γ suffice to defend s).

Condition 8 (Set of arguments with breadth bounded by j). Given a decision situation and a natural number j, a set of arguments S γ ⊆ S * has breadth bounded by j iff, for each argument
The condition is vacuous when s is attacked by at most j counter-arguments. Our last condition relaxes condition 4. We want to exclude some of the long chains in S * . But we want to tolerate long chains, including cycles, among unclear arguments: anecdotal evidence from ordinary argumentations suggests that in many (otherwise interesting) decision situations, cycles do appear in attack relations among arguments (for example, because arguments can use ambiguous terms). However, this does not necessarily prevent the situation from being modelizable in our sense. What we do need is to avoid some of the cycles or chains that involve "too many" arguments from S γ , in a somewhat technical sense captured by the following condition.
Condition 9 (Set of arguments with length bounded by k). Given a decision situation, a natural number k, and a set of arguments S γ , define a binary relation R over S γ as s 2 Rs 1 iff s 2 ⊳ ∃ s 1 or s 2 ⊳ ∃ s ⊳ ∃ s 1 for some s ∈ S * . Let R 1 = R and R k+1 = R k ○ R for any natural number k. The set S γ has length bounded by k iff ∄s 2 , s 1 ∈ S γ | s 2 R k+1 s 1 , thus, iff it is impossible to reach an argument from S γ , starting from an argument from S γ , following R more than k times.
This condition tolerates cycles in ⊳ ∃ that involve only arguments picked outside the chosen set S γ . It only forbids a subset of the situations where a cycle (or a too long chain) is built that involve arguments from S γ .
Remark 2. Readers used to decision theoretic axiomatizations might find this condition odd, since axioms usually mandate conditions considered more "basic", such as transitivity and irreflexivity, and derive from them the conclusion that cycles are forbidden. This strategy does not work for our setting (or is not applicable in a simple way), because "basic" conditions such as transitivity would be unreasonable to impose here. For example, given s 3 ⊳ ∃ s 2 and s 2 ⊳ ∃ s 1 , it is easy to think about situations where i would consider that s 3 ⋫ ∃ s 1 , and to think about situations where i would consider that s 3 ⊳ ∃ s 1 . Neither anti-transitivity nor transitivity can thus be reasonably imposed (and our current conditions avoid such requirement). Studying which conditions exactly are necessary to ban cycles (or make them innoccuous) in our setting would be interesting, but it does not seem crucial at this stage. Indeed, in concrete settings we consider that cycles involving arguments from S γ are unlikely to occur. (This claim should be backed up by empirical studies.) △ Thanks to conditions 5 to 9, we are now in a position to define our set of arguments of interest.
Definition 11 (CAC arguments). Given a decision situation and a set S γ ⊆ S * , we say that S γ is clear and covering, or CAC, iff it is closed under reinstatement and justifiably unstable, and has breadth bounded by some number j and length bounded by some number k, and is such that all arguments s ∈ S * ∖ S γ are unnecessary.
When the context makes it non ambiguous, we speak of a clear argument to refer to an argument that belongs to a CAC set of arguments.
Following the same rationale, we can define an operational criterion echoing definition 8:
Definition 12 (S γ operational validity). Given a decision situation and a set
A theorem echoing theorem 1 can then be proved.
Theorem 2. Given a decision situation
This theorem is a strengthened version of theorem 1 since it produces the same results based i) on the conditions encapsulated in the definition of CAC arguments, and ii) on S γ -validity. Those conditions are implied by the ones assumed by theorem 1. Indeed, when the conditions of theorem 1 hold, taking S γ = S * satisfies the conditions of theorem 2.
Significance of the deliberated judgment framework for decision-aiding theory and practices
Section 2 displayed the conceptual core of our framework and section 3 explained how this framework can be confronted to empirical reality. The present section reflects on the meaning, promises and limits of our approach. We start by pondering on how the various conditions spelled out in section 3 can be interpreted (section 4.1). We then take a broader view to discuss how our framework relates to the larger literature in decision science (section 4.2).
The meaning of our conditions
In order to understand the precise meaning of the conditions of theorem 1 and, more importantly, of theorem 2, an almost trivial but nonetheless very important first step is to spell out what it means if these conditions are not fulfilled. We already stressed that the conditions of theorem 1 are certainly too strong to be fulfilled. The conditions of theorem 2 are, by construction, much weaker. But still there certainly are situations where they are not fulfilled. In such cases, we do not claim that providing decision aid is impossible. Neither is our general framework, as presented in section 2, rendered bogus. The sole implication is that our approach to operational empirical validation cannot be implemented. This does not prevent, for example, the analyst from trying to identify directly decisive arguments, and this does not render irrelevant a decision aid based on decisive arguments. Neither does this prevent completely other approaches to decision aid to be implemented. The only implication is that a full-fledged implementation of our approach, including operational empirical validation, is not guaranteed to be possible in such situations. It is no part of our claim that our approach can be applied all the time and provides an all-encompassing framework liable to overcome all other decision aiding approaches. Our approach has a specific domain of application.
Beyond these simple, negative comments, how are our conditions to be understood? In general terms, these various conditions can be interpreted in three different ways:
(i) as axioms capturing minimal properties concerning arguments and the way i reasons,
(ii) as empirical hypotheses, (iii) as rules governing the decision aiding process (rules that i can commit to abide by, or can consider to be well-founded safeguards for the proper unfolding of the process).
Example 8 (Budget reform (cont.)). We can now improve example 7 by relaxing the assumptions it contains. One can envisage in turn the three possibilities spelled out above.
In interpretation (i), instead of assuming that i always reasons in such a way that S * in its entirety satisfies the conditions of theorem 1, we only assume that the set of argument S = {s, s c1 , s c2 , s c1c , s c2c , s 1,reinstated , s 2,reinstated } is CAC.
In interpretation (ii), we have to take advantage of empirical data to claim that the above set is CAC. Imagine, for example, that we have been able to show that the overwhelming majority of people does reason with respect to the arguments in this set in such a way that it can be considered CAC. This would provide strong empirical support to admit that this set can be considered CAC for the purpose of the decision aiding process at issue (assuming the weaker interpretation of S * ). In the present, mainly theoretical article, we leave aside the important difficulties that such empirical concrete applications would face.
In interpretation (iii), the analyst would start by explaining to i the content of the requirements encapsulated in the definition of a CAC set of arguments and ask her if she is willing to commit herself to reason in such a way as to fullfill these requirements when thinking about the arguments to be discussed in the process. For example, for the justifiable unstability of the set of arguments (condition 6), the analyst would ask i if she would accept to commit not to change her mind depending on her mood or any other non-argumentative factor. Notice that, as the decision aiding process unfolds, it might be that i will figure that it was not a good idea after all to commit to these various things, and in such a case the decision aiding process would fail. △ Some of the conditions of our theorems are arguably more congenial to a given interpretation. For example, it seems natural enough to interpret condition 2 as a rationality requirement of the kind that it makes sense to use as an axiom (interpretation (i)). By contrast, condition 1 is the kind of condition that can easily be translated in the form of rules than decision-makers can be asked to abide by when they engage in a decision-aiding process (interpretation (iii)). Conditions 3 and 4 can easily be seen as empirical hypotheses (interpretation (ii)). By construction, conditions 6 to 9 are weakened versions of the above stronger conditions. They accordingly inherit the preferred interpretation suggested above.
However, although it is tempting to draw such connexions between specific conditions and specific interpretations, at a more abstract level all the conditions above can be interpreted in all three interpretations. The different conditions can even be interpreted differently in the context of different implementations. In the present, largely formal work, we want to leave all these possibilities open. Future, more empirically oriented works, should assess if and when these different interpretations can be used, in particular by elaborating and implementing the convenient empirical validation in interpretation (ii) and the convenient participatory procedures in interpretation (iii).
The deliberated judgment framework in perspective
Now that the meaning of the conditions of our theorems is clarified, we are in a firmer position to discuss the nature of our contribution to the literature.
The central, distinctive concept of our approach is the one of deliberated judgments of an individual. Deliberated judgments are the propositions that the individual herself considers based on decisive arguments, on due consideration. This formulation highlights the two key features of the concept.
The first key feature is that deliberated judgments are the result of a careful examination of arguments and counter-arguments. This echoes the approach to the notion of rationality developped most prominently by Habermas [1981] . In this approach, actions, attitudes or utterances can be termed "rational" so long as the actor(s) performing or having them can account for them, explain them and use arguments and counter-arguments to withstand criticisms that other people could raise against them. Variants of this vision of rationality play a key role in other prominent philosophical frameworks, such as Scanlon's [2000] and Sen's [2009] . Having in mind this approach to rationality, in the remainder of this discussion, we will therefore simply talk about "rationality" when referring to this first idea underlying our framework.
The second key feature is that deliberated judgments are nevertheless the individual's own judgments, in the sense that they do not reflect the application of any exogenous criterion. This second idea can also be nicknamed, for brievety's stake, by simply talking about "anti-paternalism".
Our approach, when applied in a decision aiding perspective, requires admitting the soundness of these two normative notions of rationality and nonpaternalism.
Our approach however also has a strong descriptive dimension, which is a direct implication of the very meaning of non-paternalism. Though we are interested in deliberated judgments rather than in shallow preferences, still the deliberated judgments that we are interested in are the ones of real, empirical individuals that are not constrained by our framework to adhere to a specific set of exogeneous stances. These descriptive aspects feed a normative approach that accordingly owes its normative credentials both to its normative foundations and to its reference to empirical reality.
Due to this double anchorage in normative and descriptive aspects, our approach opens avenues to overcome perenial difficulties facing decision theory concerning its descriptive vs. normative status. Indeed, our framework sets the stage for decision-aiding practices that could have a crucial strength as compared with more standard approaches, by including rigorous tests of whether individuals endorse or not various arguments and argumentative lines, thereby eschewing both to actively advocate them (a purely normative approach) and to leave the invidual in the ignorance of their existence (a purely descriptive approach). As opposed to standard approaches, decision-aiding practices based on deliberated judgments thereby provide compelling reasons for the aided individual to think that the decisions he makes once he has been aided are better than the one he would have made otherwise. Such reasons are liable to play a key role in strengthening the legitimacy and validity of decision-aiding -two requirements largely discussed in the literature [Landry et al., 1996 [Landry et al., , 1983 .
In order to illustrate this idea, it is useful to compare our framework to more classical approches, such as utility theory. Proponents of utility theory could claim that utility functions provide arguments that individuals will consider convincing [Savage, 1972 , Morgenstern, 1979 , Raiffa, 1985 , and that therefore our approach will converge towards utility theory. However, the power of conviction of utility-based arguments is debatable [Ellsberg, 1961 , Allais, 1979 . Psychologists have tried to test it experimentally [Slovic and Tversky, 1974, MacCrimmon and Larsson, 1979] . But such tests can hardly be considered conclusive: the meaning of their results depends on how arguments have been presented to the individuals and on whether counter-arguments have been presented, as Slovic and Tversky [1974] themselves point out. Such a systematic confrontation with counter-arguments is precisely what our proposed framework allows to implement.
The formal framework presented in this article will however only live up to its promises if empirical applications are developed. Researchers in artificial intelligence [Labreuche, 2011] and persuasion [Carenini and Moore, 2006] have produced ways of "translating" formal Multi-Attribute Value Theory models into textual arguments, that could possibly provide promising tools to develop such applications.
A. Proofs, and additional explanatory results
Our main goal in this section is to prove theorem 2. We do this by first proving that if a set S γ is CAC, then it is efficient (to be defined shortly). This requires a few intermediate lemmas. Efficiency will bring a number of consequences of interest to us, among which theorem 2. As a second goal, we want to give some further results that help understand the relationship between the notions of clearcut, validity and operational validity, existence of a set of argument that is CAC, and efficiency.
A set of arguments S ⊆ S * is efficient when it includes enough decisive arguments to settle the issue.
Definition 13 (Efficiency). Given a decision situation
In all this section, we assume we are given a decision situation (T, S * , ↝, ⊳ ∃ , ⋫ ∃ ) and a subset of arguments S γ ⊆ S * (unless mentioned otherwise, namely, in theorem 5 and its follower).
Define a coalition as a set of arguments, a cl-argument as an argument in S γ , a cl-coalition as a set of cl-arguments.
Our strategy for proving that CAC imply efficiency, roughly speaking, involve excluding "undecided" attack situations. For example, we want to exclude that an argument be clear, have no cl-argument that decisively attacks it, but also be not defended. We will do this by progressively promoting or degrading arguments, e.g., show that if a cl-argument is resistant (has no cl-argument that decisively attacks it), then it must also be defended, and if it is defended, it must be essentially replaceable by decisive cl-arguments.
Define S decisive as the decisive arguments. Define S defended ⊆ S * as the arguments finitely defended: s ∈ S defended iff ∃S ⊆ S γ ∩ S decisive , with ⊳ −1 ∃ (s) ⊆ ⊳ ∃ (S), S finite. Define S no-cl-dec-att ⊆ S * as the resistant arguments, meaning, those not attacked by any decisive cl-argument: s ∈ S no-cl-dec-att iff ⊳ −1 ∃ (s) ∩ S γ ∩ S decisive = ∅. The complementary set S cl-dec-att = S no-cl-dec-att contains the arguments attacked by some decisive cl-argument.
Define S no-cl-def-att ⊆ S * as the arguments not attacked by any defended clargument: s ∈ S no-cl-def-att iff ⊳ −1 ∃ (s) ∩ S γ ∩ S defended = ∅. The complementary set S cl-def-att = S no-cl-def-att contains the arguments attacked by some defended clargument.
Define S cl-res-att ⊆ S * as the arguments attacked by some resistant cl-argument: s ∈ S cl-res-att iff ⊳ −1 ∃ (s) ∩ S γ ∩ S no-cl-dec-att ≠ ∅. Define S quasi-decisive ⊆ S * as the arguments that are replaceable by some finite decisive cl-coalition: s ∈ S quasi-decisive iff ∃S ⊆ S γ ∩ S decisive with S finite replacing s.
Define S ess-decisive ⊆ S * as the arguments that are essentially replaceable by some finite decisive cl-coalition: s ∈ S ess-decisive iff ∃S ⊆ S γ ∩ S decisive with S finite essentially replacing s.
Lemma 1 (S γ ∩S defended ⊆ S quasi-decisive ). Assume S γ is Closed under reinstatement and Justifiably unstable. If s ∈ S γ ∩ S defended , then s ∈ S quasi-decisive . Proof. From s ∈ S defended , we know some finite coalition S defend s. Assuming S ≠ ∅, pick any s 1 ∈ S, thus, s 1 ∈ S γ ∩ S decisive . From Justifiable unstability, as s 1 ∈ S decisive , ⊳ ∃ (s 1 ) = ⊳ ∀ (s 1 ). We can assume that s 1 ≠ s, otherwise s is decisive and the proof is done, and we know that s 1 does not attack s, otherwise s is attacked by a decisive argument and thus not defended. We can thus apply Closed under reinstatement to (s, s 1 ).
We obtain that for some s ′ ∈ S γ , s ′ replaces s and ⊳ −1 ∃ (s ′ ) ⊆ ⊳ −1 ∃ (s) ∖ ⊳ ∃ (s 1 ). As the attackers of s ′ is a subset of the attackers of s, S also defends s ′ . We may proceed again, picking another argument s 2 ∈ S and obtaining another replacer s ′′ ∈ S γ having as attackers a subset of ⊳ −1 ∃ (s) ∖ ⊳ ∃ (s 1 ) ∖ ⊳ ∃ (s 2 ). Observe that ⊳ −1 ∃ (s) ⊆ ⋃ s k ∈S ⊳ ∃ (s k ), as S attacks all the attackers of s. Iterating the process over the finite coalition S, we will thus obtain a decisive cl-argument replacing s.
Lemma 2 (cl-res-att or repl). Assume S γ is covering. ∀s ∈ S * ∶ s ∈ S cl-res-att or s is essentially replaceable by some S ⊆ S γ ∩ S no-cl-dec-att .
Proof. Let P (s) denote that s is essentially replaceable by some S ⊆ S γ ∩ S no-cl-dec-att . From covering, if s ∉ S γ , s is unnecessary. By definition, s is unnecessary iff s ∈ S cl-res-att or P (s). Observe also that [s ∈ S cl-dec-att ] ⇒ [s ∈ S cl-res-att ], as a decisive attacker is a resistant attacker.We obtain that if [¬P (s) ∧ s ∉ S γ ] or [s ∈ S cl-dec-att ], then s ∈ S cl-res-att . Otherwise, P (s) or [s ∈ S γ ∩ S no-cl-dec-att ].
Lemma 3 (S γ ∩S no-cl-dec-att ⊆ S defended ). Assume S γ is CAC. If s ∈ S γ ∩S no-cl-dec-att , then s ∈ S defended .
Proof. We claim that, starting from any argument s ∈ S γ ∩ S no-cl-dec-att ∩ S defended , we can find an argument s * in the same set, with s * attacking s or s * attacking some attacker s 1 of s. This will show that S γ ∩S no-cl-dec-att ∩S defended = ∅, otherwise by iterating the reasoning we would contradict (weak) Bounded length.
Recall that bounded breadth requires, for all s ∈ S γ , that if s is defended, then s is finitely defended: [⊳ −1 ∃ (s) ⊆ ⊳ ∃ (S γ ∩ S decisive )] implies that ∃S ⊆ S γ ∩ S decisive with ⊳ −1 ∃ (s) ⊆ ⊳ ∃ (S) and S finite. Consider s ∈ S γ ∩S no-cl-dec-att ∩S defended . (Recall that S defended contains the finitely defended arguments.) Thanks to Bounded breadth and s ∉ S defended , ∃s 1 ⊳ ∃ s with s 1 ∉ ⊳ ∃ (S γ ∩ S decisive ). Therefore, s 1 ∈ S no-cl-dec-att .
The following theorem may help clarify the relationship between efficiency, existence of CAC arguments, and the situation admitting a model as we conceive it.
Theorem 5 (CAC subset equivalent to efficiency). Given a decision situation (T, S * , ↝, ⊳ ∃ , ⋫ ∃ ) and a subset of arguments S ⊆ S * , there exists a set S γ ⊆ S that is CAC iff S is efficient.
Proof. From [CAC implies efficiency], if some set S γ ⊆ S is CAC, then S γ is efficient, and because efficiency propagates to supersets, S is efficient.
If S is efficient (thus, the decision situation is clear-cut), then a CAC subset S γ exists: suffices to choose as members of S γ only the decisive arguments required to support the accepted propositions and attack the supporters s ↝ t of rejected propositions. Observing that no arguments attack any argument in the resulting set (thus s⊳ ∃ s γ for no s ∈ S * , s γ ∈ S γ ), most of the conditions for S γ to be CAC are immediately seen to be satisfied. About arguments s ∈ S * ∖S γ being unnecessary, we only have to show that when s ↝ t, either s is attacked by an argument from S γ that has no decisive attacker, or s is essentially replaceable by arguments from S γ . Indeed, by our construction of S γ , if s supports an accepted t, it is essentially replaceable, and otherwise, it is attacked by a decisive argument.
